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THE MEANING OF LIFE: DEFINING
"MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES" UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
KIREN DOSANJH ZUCKER*

I. INTRODUCTION

"[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older,"' denying them "the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis... and cost[ing] the United States billions of dollars in2
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."
With that proclamation, Congress enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).' The ADA's intent is clear, but the extent of

its protection has been an object of confusion among employers, and a
subject of scrutiny by the federal courts. What makes these estimated
43,000,000 Americans "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA?
In defining "disability" under the ADA, Congress turned to the

definition of what it means to be handicapped under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act). 4 Under the Rehabilitation Act,
handicap means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major.., life activities" of the individual, "a record
of such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such an
Assistant Professor, College of Business and Economics, California State University
Northridge, Northridge, CA. The author wishes to thank her husband, Professor Bruce
Zucker, for the wonderful life he has given her.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2002).
2. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act not only prohibits disability discrimination in
employment, but also provides that failure to make reasonable accommodation is a form of
unlawful discrimination. The ADA states that a covered employer must provide "reasonable
accommodations" for the "physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship." Id. § 12112(b)(5). A "qualified
individual with a disability" is defined as an individual "who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position" at issue.
Id. § 12111(8).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 361 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)
(2002)).
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impairment. "' 5
Such reliance offered comfort to disability rights
advocates and congressional supporters of the ADA, who were
confident that the same individuals who had been covered under the
existing federal anti-discrimination protections would be covered under
the ADA.6 This confidence, however, was short-lived: For the past ten
years, challenges to the ADA's coverage have led to judicial parsing of
every term in the definition of disability, and the subsequent failure to
protect individuals with a wide range of impairments from
discrimination.7
This Article will focus on the United States Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams8 which dissected the meaning of the terms "substantial
limitation" and "major life activities."9 Without attempting to review
judicial interpretation of each segment of the statutory definition of
disability, this Article will analyze Toyota as an example of the Court's
narrowing approach to the ADA's coverage. Part III will then discuss
recent federal court decisions applying Toyota that demonstrate the
confusion caused by this decision. The Article will conclude with
possible solutions that could resolve the confusion and protect the ADA
from further dilution in the wake of Toyota, including a suggestion to
employers planning to implement Toyota in their employment practices.
II. WORK VS. "REAL LIFE:" TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING V.
WILLIAMS
The threshold question in most cases brought under the ADA is
whether the plaintiff has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits that person in at least one major life activity." In

5. Id. In adopting this language, Congress changed "handicap" to "disability."
U.S.C. § 12102(2).

42

6. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under FederalAnti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
91, 92 (2000).
7. Id. at 93.
8. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
9. Id. at 193-94.
10. In most cases, the existence of an impairment is not contested. See Curtis D.
Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of "Major Life Activity" in the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 321, 323 (2002) (citing Lisa Eichhorn,
Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the 'Disability'
Definition in the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1424-25
(1999)). A "physical or mental impairment" is defined as:
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addressing this question, federal courts have not been without guidance.
The EEOC regulations define "major life activities" as "functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working."" The appendix to the
regulations clarifies that "this list is not exhaustive."' 2 Further, "'major
life activities' are those basic activities that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 3
An impairment substantially limits a major life activity if the
individual is either unable to perform or is "significantly restricted as...
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform" the activity in question. 4' The
EEOC regulations emphasize individualized assessments of whether an
individual's impairment rises to the level of a disability. 5
The facts of Toyota offered a rather typical ADA scenario. The
employer did not dispute that the worker's carpal tunnel syndrome
amounted to a physical impairment." The controversy centered on
whether the impairment substantially limited her in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks. 7 The fact that the worker's job on
an assembly line required her to perform manual tasks would add
complexity to the issue reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.

(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or physiological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 84.36)(2)(i) (2001).
11. Edmonds, supra note 10, at 323-24 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §. 1630.2(i)).
12. Id. at 324 (quoting 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(i)).
13. Id. at 323-24 (quoting 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(i)).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20). The EEOC regulations also set forth the factors to consider
when determining substantial limitation: the nature, severity, duration, and permanence of
the impairment. See id. § 1630.20)(2).
15. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 140.
16. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002).
17. Id.
18. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor stated that "[w]e express no
opinion on the working, lifting, or other arguments [sic] for disability status.., not ruled
upon by the Court of Appeals." Id. at 193. Nevertheless, O'Connor's reference to the major
life activity of working later in the opinion is the probable source of the lower courts'
confusion discussed infra at Part III. See id. at 200.
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A. Facts
Williams began work on the assembly line at the Georgetown,
Kentucky Toyota automobile manufacturing plant in 1990.29 Her duties
required the use of pneumatic tools, which eventually caused pain that
was diagnosed as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome by her employer's inhouse medical service.' Her personal physician placed her on work
restrictions that led to her assignment in various "modified duty" jobs.2
Despite the availability of these modifications and her continued
employment, Williams decided to go on medical leave and filed a state
workers' compensation claim.2 Dissatisfied with her employer's effort
to accommodate her work restrictions, Williams brought a claim under
the ADA, alleging that her employer had unlawfully refused to
accommodate her disability.2' After settling this suit, Williams returned
to work at the plant in 1993 in an assignment as a quality-control
inspector.4
According to Williams, her condition worsened while in this new
position and the company once again refused to accommodate her. 5
Her employer denied those allegations, maintaining that she began
missing work on a regular basis, and eventually cited poor attendance as
the reason for her second termination from the company in 1997.26
B. ProceduralHistory
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Williams filed
suit against Toyota claiming that it had violated the ADA by failing to
reasonably accommodate her disability and by terminating her
employmentY Addressing the threshold issue of whether she was
"disabled" under the ADA, Williams averred that "her physical
impairments substantially limited her in [performing]: (1) manual tasks;
(2) housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing with her children; (5) lifting;
and (6) working," and argued that all of these constituted major life

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 189.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.

Id.
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activities under the ADA." Alternatively, she asserted, she was
protected under the ADA because she had both a record of a
"substantially limiting impairment" and was regarded "as having such
29
an impairment. ,
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky granted summary judgment to Toyota." After rejecting
Williams's arguments that gardening, housework, and playing with
children are major life activities, the district court reasoned that
Williams had failed to offer sufficient evidence that she was substantially
limited in manual tasks, lifting, and working, finding that such a claim
was "irretrievably contradicted" by her insistence that she could
perform the tasks in assembly and inspection "without difficulty. 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling that Williams was not disabled at the time she
sought an accommodation, holding that her impairment prevented her
from doing the range of tasks associated with certain types of manual
assembly-line jobs.32 Therefore, the court concluded that Williams was
entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of whether she was
"disabled" under the ADA.3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper
standard for assessing whether an impairment substantially limits an
individual in performing manual tasks.34 The Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit's decision to grant partial summary judgment.35
C. Justice O'Connor'sOpinion
In seeking guidance for interpreting the meaning of "disability"
under the ADA, Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court,
noted "two potential sources:" First, the regulations issued by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and second, the EEOC regulations
regarding the ADA.36 However, Justice O'Connor expressed concern
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B-C) (1994)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 191.
32. Id. at 191-92.
33. Id. at 192.
34. See Toyota Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 532 U.S. 970 (2001) (mem.) (granting
certiorari).
35. 543 U.S. at 192-93.
36. Id. at 193. Justice O'Connor noted that the express provision in the ADA directing
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that the EEOC may have overstepped its authority in defining the term
"disability" under the ADA.37 The EEOC "created its own definition"
of disability for the purposes of the ADA, but as Justice O'Connor
recognized, it did so because the HEW regulations did not address the
meaning of "substantial limitation" of major life activities."
Nevertheless, given the parties' acceptance of the EEOC regulations'
reasonableness, the Court "assume[d] without deciding" that the
regulations were reasonable, although Justice O'Connor reserved
judgment on the level of deference to which the regulations should be
accorded.39

Regulations issued by both HEW and EEOC include the
performance of manual tasks in the definition of major life activities.'
How should the Sixth Circuit have determined whether Williams was
substantially limited in this major life activity? While acknowledging
the EEOC's definition of substantial limitation,4 Justice O'Connor
asserted that the Court must address an issue on which the EEOC
regulations are silent-the definition of substantial limitation in the
"specific major life activity of performing manual tasks."42 While not
expressly at issue, Justice O'Connor nevertheless implicitly
communicated the level of deference given to the EEOC regulations43
by turning to Webster's Dictionary as the primary source of interpretive

the statute not to be "construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
... the Rehabilitation Act of 1973...." Id. at 194 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)). The
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued the Rehabilitation Act
regulations in 1977, defining "physical impairment." This definition is identical to the EEOC
regulations regarding the ADA. See supra note 10 for the EEOC regulation.
37. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194. According to Justice O'Connor, "no agency has been given
authority to issue regulations interpreting the term 'disability' under the ADA." Id. Given
the EEOC's role in federal anti-discrimination legislation, including the ADA, perhaps this
critique is unwarranted. Further, as recognized in Bragdon v. Abbott, agencies charged with
statutory implementation hold a "body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (citing Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 501
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the opinion of an "agency charged with
implementation" of a statute should be "accorded respect.") (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 556 (1980)).
38. 534 U.S. at 195.
39. Id. at 194 (stating that the "level of deference" to which the regulations should be
accorded was not at issue); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
40. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §. 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2001)); see also supra note 10.
41. See supra note 14.
42. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196.
43. See supra note 37.
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guidance."

1. Webster's Definition of "Substantially" and "Major"
According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
"substantial" means "considerable in amount, value, or worth." 45 Justice
O'Connor interpreted this definition to mean "considerable" or "to a
Thus, "[t]he word 'substantial' clearly precludes
large degree."'
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of
manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities" under the ADA. 47 While it
may be assumed that Justice O'Connor was merely referring to the
major life activity relevant to Toyota, this statement, read literally,
seems to emphasize that disabilities must be evaluated solely in the
context of manual tasks and to the exclusion of other major life activities
cited in the EEOC regulations.
"'Major' means important," asserted Justice O'Connor. 9 Once
again referring to Webster's Dictionary, Justice O'Connor noted that
"major" is defined as "greater in dignity, rank, importance, or
'
Of course, the application of this term requires some
interest. "
subjective evaluation, as does the literal use of the word "substantial."
What is an activity of great importance or interest to one person may be

relatively insignificant to another.
44. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196.
45. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 2280 (1976)).
46. Id. at 197.
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. The House Judiciary Report
(Report) on the ADA highlights the potential impact of this emphasis on performance of
manual tasks. In analyzing the meaning of "substantial limitation" in the context of work, the
Report offered this scenario:
[I]f a person is employed as a painter and is assigned to work with a unique paint
which caused severe allergies, such as skin rashes or seizures, the person would be
substantially limited in a major life activity, by virtue of the resulting skin disease or
seizure disorder ....In such a case, a reasonable accommodation to the employee
may include assignment to other areas where the particular paint is not used.
Feldblum, supra note 6, at 133 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485 (III) (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445). Professor Feldblum notes the ease with which the Report assumed that a
person with a severe allergic reaction would be considered to be substantially limited in some
major life activity other than working. Id. at 134.
49. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197. If the "manual tasks" emphasis is taken and applied literally
to the Report's scenario, see supra note 48, then the painter would probably not be
considered disabled, as that person could arguably still perform the manual tasks defined as
'major" under Toyota.
50. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363 (1976)).
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However, the Court seemed to purposefully ignore the relativity of
assigning an activity this level of importance. Using the literal definition
of the word "major," Justice O'Connor then offered that major life
activities refers to "those activities that are of central importance to
daily life."5" In order for the performance of manual tasks to qualify as a
major life activity under this definition, Justice O'Connor continued, the
manual tasks "must be central to daily life."52 To whose daily life was
the Court referring?
2. Individualized Assessment 3 vs. "Majority Rules:" Defining "Major
Life Activities"
Taking the terms of the "disability" definition and applying that
definition to the facts at hand, Justice O'Connor set forth the standard
for determining whether Ms. Williams was disabled under the ADA.
According to the Court, in order "to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are
of central importance to most people's daily lives."54 Thus, "daily life"
did not refer to the individual, but rather to the majority of society.
Federal courts would be left to determine whether a particular activity
played a significant role in, not just the impaired individual's life, but in
most individuals' lives.
The Toyota Court's categorical approach to defining major life
activities appears to contradict a fundamental concept behind the ADA;
the existence of a disability should be determined on a case-by-case
basis." The United States Supreme Court recognized this emphasis on
individualized assessment in Toyota and other recent cases, including
56
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. and Albertson 's,Inc. v. Kirkingburg.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Feldblum, supra note 6, at 110, for a discussion of the history of "individualized
assessment" in defining disability under anti-discrimination statutes.
54. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). Note that in the appendix to the EEOC
regulations defining major life activities, the EEOC used the average person in the general
population as its measure. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor's
reference to the majority deviates significantly from this measure.
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
56. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) and Albertson's, 527
U.S. 555, 566 (1999)). Both Sutton and Albertson's are part of a line of decisions holding that
impairments must be evaluated in their corrected states. Thus, an impairment's impact on
major life activities would be determined in light of mitigating measures such as medical
devices and medication. See Marcia Coyle, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings Limit ADA 's Scope,
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The Court's emphasis on typical lives rather than the life of the

impaired individual is also contrary to its ruling in another seminal
ADA case, Bragdon v. Abbott.7 As Justice O'Connor noted in Toyota,
the Court in Bragdon relied on unchallenged testimony that the
respondent's HIV infection led her to decide not to have a child." The
Bragdon Court stated that "[t]he determination of whether an
individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or
diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of
that impairment on the life of the individual.'"'

If Toyota had been

decided before Bragdon, perhaps the Court would have analyzed
whether childbearing was an activity of central importance to most
people's daily lives to determine
whether the respondent was truly
0

"disabled" by her HIV infection
Justice O'Connor criticized the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit for ignoring Ms. Williams's ability to bathe, brush her teeth, and
perform household chores. According to the Court, these activities "are
among the types of manual tasks of central importance to people's daily
lives. 6 As such, the Sixth Circuit erred in treating these activities as
irrelevant in assessing whether Ms. Williams was "substantially limited"
in performing manual tasks.62 By including personal hygiene in its list of
"manual tasks" that are central to daily life, the Court appears to
submerge the major life activity of caring for oneself into the
performance of manual tasks.63

24 NAT'L L.J. 21, Jan. 28,2002, at Al.
57. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
58. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
59. Id. at 198 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641-42 (emphasis added)).
60. As noted by Edmonds, supra note 10, at 351, several cases after Bragdon have
addressed whether one of the activities involved in childbearing, namely sexual relations, is a
separate major life activity. For example, in McAlindin v. County of San Diego, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that an individual whose panic disorder impaired his ability to engage in sexual
relations was "disabled" under the ADA. 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth
Circuit found that "[t]he number of people who engage in sexual relations is plainly larger
than the number who choose to have children." Id. This reference to the number of those
engaging in sexual relations in determining it to be a major life activity seems to foreshadow
Toyota.
61. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.
62. Id.
63. Edmonds supra note 10, at 369 (noting that "the activities of bathing and brushing
one's teeth would seem to be part of caring for oneself but were specifically cited by the
Court [in Toyota] as examples of manual tasks.").
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3. "Working" vs. "Performing Manual Tasks:" A Line is Drawn
While the Toyota Court focused on the "performance of manual
tasks," the Court also addressed "working" as a major life activity.64
Justice O'Connor stated that the "conceptual difficulties" raised by the
inclusion of working as a major life activity made the Court hesitant to
hold as much. In declaring that the Court need not have decided "this
difficult question"at that time, Justice O'Connor nevertheless reviewed
the standard utilized in determining whether an impaired individual is
"substantially limited" in their ability to work under the ADA."
As noted in Sutton, assuming that work is a major life activity, "a
claimant would be required to show an inability to work in a 'broad
range of jobs,' rather than a specific job. "66 The EEOC regulations also
set forth that, with respect to working, substantially limits means
"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or
' The EEOC did not suggest that this "classa broad range of jobs."67
based framework" applies to other major life activities.6 Therefore,
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Sixth Circuit erred in assuming
that Ms. Williams's inability to perform a "class" of manual tasks
supported a finding of "disability" under the ADA. Interestingly, the
Court appeared comfortable in creating a class of manual tasks
regarding personal hygiene.
A claimant's inability to perform a "class of manual tasks" unique
to her job does not support a finding that she is "disabled" under the
ADA. This point appears to be the driving force behind Justice
'
The Sixth
O'Connor's detailed discussion of the "'class' concept."69
Circuit focused on the manual tasks required of Ms. Williams's positions
at Toyota in determining that she was within the ADA's protection.
Justice O'Connor urged that such an approach would allow an impaired
individual to fashion ADA claims based on that individual's inability to
perform a specific job as opposed to a broad range of jobs-tasks
64. 534 U.S. at 199.
65. Id. (citing Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.
2000)). Justice O'Connor noted that the court of appeals had raised the issue by asserting
that Ms. Williams must show that her manual disability involves a "class of manual activities"
that "affect the ability to perform tasks at work." Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 200 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999)).
67. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3) (2001)).
68. The EEOC regulations regarding the meaning of "substantial limitation" with
respect to work were designed to address the unique situation of an individual whose
impairment "manifests itself only at work." Feldblum, supra note 6, at 137-38.
69. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200.
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associated with a specific job could be "recast as an inability to perform
a 'class' of tasks. ,70
Perhaps in an effort to further protect against claims based on
inability to perform a specific job, Justice O'Connor then urged that
"occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the
manual task inquiry" because they are "not necessarily important parts
of most people's lives."'" For example, Ms. Williams's inability to do
"repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder
levels for extended periods of time... is not an important part of most
people's daily lives."72 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit should not have
considered the limitation sufficient proof that Ms. Williams was
"disabled" under the meaning of the ADA.73
Most people do not work on assembly lines, but for those who do,
perhaps such an inability would render them ineligible for the range of
jobs for which they are trained, especially if their employers were not
required to provide them with reasonable accommodation.
Thus,
while Justice O'Connor intensely focused on keeping the major life
activities of "performance of manual tasks" and "working" separate, the
two are inextricably linked in those occupations requiring manual labor.
4. The Numbers Game: 43 Million Seems Low
Toyota revealed the Court's intent behind its strict interpretation of
the ADA's definition of "disability." Ironically, Justice O'Connor
turned to the congressional findings set forth in the first section of the
ADA that support the stated purpose of the statute's protections:75 "[I]f
Congress intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded
the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult
manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled
Americans
76
would surely have been much higher [than 43 million]."
70. Id. at 201.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.
2000)).
74. See infra Part III.B.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2002).
76. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101). Justice O'Connor also cited
Sutton: "[Given that 100 million people need corrective lenses to see properly, h]ad Congress
intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by
the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number [than 43 million] .... " Id. at
197-98 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999)). Interestingly, in his
dissenting opinion in Sutton, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, stated that "by reason
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While Congress chose to assert a figure in approximating the
number of Americans who qualify as disabled under the ADA, it gave a
more general estimate under the Rehabilitation Act, stating that
"millions of Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities."77 Additionally, Congress averred that "the number of
Americans with such disabilities is increasing."" Taken together, the
numerical statements made in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
appear to be intended to simply emphasize that there is a significant
percentage of the American population who are socially disadvantaged
due to their disability.79
Creating a demanding standard for defining "disability" under the
ADA obviously limits the number of those who qualify for protection.
Employers may view this restriction as a victory that reduces the burden
of compliance with the ADA. 0 However, as discussed below,81 Toyota
may create other concerns for employers as it raises new factual issues in
ADA cases.
III. "LIFE AFTER TOYOTA:" FEDERAL COURTS' POST-TOYOTA
DEFINITION OF "DISABILITY"

Toyota does not offer solid boundaries separating work-related
manual tasks from those manual tasks that are of "central importance to
most people's daily lives."82 The Court stated only that occupationspecific tasks "are not necessarily important parts of most people's
lives,"83 and therefore may not meet the definition of major life activity
under the ADA. Do tasks such as keyboarding and writing, which may
be fundamental to certain professions, constitute a major life activity?
Another issue left to the federal courts is whether an impaired
individual's inability to complete tasks associated with an occupation for
of legislative myopia [Congress] may not have foreseen that its definition of 'disability' might
theoretically encompass, not just 'some 43,000,000 Americans,' but perhaps two or three
times that number." See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(1) (2002)). However, neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Breyer dissented in
Toyota.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2002).
78. Id.
79. See § 701(a)(2) ("[I]ndividuals with disabilities constitute one of the most
disadvantaged groups in society.").
80. See supra note 3.
81. See infra Part IV.
82. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); see also supra
note 54.
83. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
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which he is trained would "substantially limit" the major life activity of
working. Finally, an issue indirectly raised by Toyota is whether an
impaired individual's ability to perform the essential job functions with
reasonable accommodation revokes his protection under the ADA.
The following ADA decisions from the lower federal judiciary illustrate
the confusion created in Toyota's wake.
A. Work and Daily Life: Mutually Exclusive or One and the Same?
In Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.," the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether a newspaper reporter inflicted
with carpal tunnel syndrome was "disabled" under the ADA."
Thornton could not use a keyboard for more than thirty minutes at a
time, or sixty minutes intermittently per day, and could not write for
more than five minutes at a time or sixty minutes intermittently per
day.86 Two members of the three-judge panel remained unpersuaded
that Thornton was an "individual with a disability" under the ADA by
virtue of her diminished capacity to engage in "continuous keyboarding
or handwriting. "87
Writing for the majority, Judge Hawkins implied that keyboarding
and writing might be manual tasks that are major life activities.
However, "continuous keyboarding and handwriting is different. ... "
Judge Hawkins noted that "lawyers and law office personnel would
undoubtedly consider continuous keyboarding and handwriting to be
activities of central importance to their lives." 9 Nevertheless, the
majority was unsure as to whether these activities are centrally
important to "'most people's daily lives.'"0 If continuous keyboarding
and writing are not centrally important to most people's daily lives, but
intermittent keyboarding and writing are, the issue remained as to
whether Thornton was "substantially limited" in these major life
activities. While conceding that her life has been "diminished" by her
84. 292 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).
85. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Thornton's ADA claims prior to the
Supreme Court's resolution of Toyota. See 261 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001). After staying its
mandate pending the announcement of Toyota, the court solicited and considered the parties'
views on the impact of that decision, and wrote to clarify its earlier opinion in light of Toyota.
Thornton, 292 F.3d at 1045.
86. Thornton, 261 F.3d at 793.
87. Thornton, 292 F.3d at 1046.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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reduced keyboarding and writing capacity, Judge Hawkins averred
without explanation that this diminishment did not amount to a
substantial limitation. 9'
Dissenting, Judge Berzon asserted that the majority treated
workplace activities as irrelevant in determining whether such an
activity is "'of central importance in most people's daily lives. ' "92
Correctly noting that under Toyota, an inability to complete workrelated tasks is not dispositive in an ADA inquiry, Judge Berzon then
reminded the court that Toyota nevertheless allowed for work-related
tasks to bear on the manual task inquiry. 93 Further, Judge Berzon
argued, using a computer and writing by hand are not tasks confined to
Thornton's occupation, but could be considered to be "tool[s]
fundamental in the modern economy., 94 Judge Berzon also took
exception to the majority's characterization of using a keyboard for
thirty minutes as "continuous keyboarding."95 Additionally, given the
prevalence of computer use in modern daily life, the inability to
"keyboard" for more than an hour a day would fundamentally alter
most people's lives, absent accommodation.96
Judge Berzon's dissenting opinion then segued into a discussion of
the impact that Thornton's impairment had on her ability to work.
Thornton would not only be unable to keep her job, but would have to
give up her profession as a newspaper reporter. Judge Berzon predicted
that Thornton "would have a hard time" transferring her skills into
another occupational field. 7 Thus, Judge Berzon implied that
Thornton's impairment not only impacts her personal life, but also
substantially limits her ability to engage in the major life activity of
working. Judge Berzon posited that the jury could have determined that
the impact of Thornton's impairment on her professional and personal
life, weighed together, was indeed substantially limiting. 9
91. Id. at 1053-54 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 1048 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002)).
93. Id. Interestingly, Judge Berzon quoted Justice O'Connor as stating that occupationspecific tasks "may have 'limited relevance to the manual task inquiry." Id. at 1048 (quoting
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added)). As noted above, Justice O'Connor's statement
was that "occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance" in such an inquiry.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94. Thornton, 292 F.3d at 1048 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1049 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions in Thornton
illustrate the confusion created by Justice O'Connor's efforts to
distinguish between occupation-specific tasks and those manual tasks
that are central to daily life. The majority treated manual tasks related
to an occupation, such as continuous keyboarding or writing, as
irrelevant to Thornton's ADA claim, as most people do not need to
continuously keyboard or write.99 Judge Berzon's dissent focuses on

Toyota's begrudging recognition of the possible relevance of
occupation-specific tasks to the "manual tasks inquiry." However,
Judge Berzon may have been trying to blur the line between work and
daily life to a greater extent than allowed under the ADA. The
suggestion that the impact of Thornton's impairment should be
determined by weighing both her personal and professional lives
together ignores the statutory definition of disability: "[A]n impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [the]
individual."'00
The substantial limitation on each major life activity must

therefore be considered separately, not collectively.
Similarly, keeping separate the issues of whether a task is a major
life activity and whether the individual's impairment substantially limits
it would help reduce the confusion created by Toyota. In ADA cases
involving claims of actual disability in performing manual tasks, 1°' the
first question should be whether the task or tasks are of central
importance to most people's daily lives.'0 If the court decides that they
are, then the impact of the individual's impairment on this major life
activity should be weighed to determine whether the individual is
substantially limited in the major life activity. If the impaired individual
can prove substantial limitation, then the inquiry need go no further.' 3
If the individual fails to show that a substantial limitation in the
performance of manual tasks as a major life activity, then other major,
life activities, such as working, should be considered. The inquiry
99. Id. at 1047 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2002) (emphasis added).
101. The suggested approach is limited to claims raised under § 12102(2)(A): a
"physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
Analyses of claims based on a record of impairment under § 12102(2)(B) or being regarded as
having such an impairment under § 12102(2)(C) are not included in this discussion.
102. This inquiry utilizes Toyota's standard for performance of manual tasks as a major
life activity.
103. If the case involves an employer's failure to accommodate, then the issue of
whether the individual is "qualified" for the job in question would be considered. In this
inquiry, the individual's ability to perform the essential job functions with or without
reasonable accommodation would then be analyzed. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
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should then proceed to whether the impairment substantially limits the
individual from working by severely restricting the ability to do a "class"
or "broad range" of jobs. This approach would avoid confusing the
separate issues of whether a manual task is a major life activity and
whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity, Additionally, this method would maintain the distinction
between impairments that affect only the ability to do a specific job and
those that substantially limit one or more major life activities.
B. "Class of Jobs ":Where Does the "BroadRange" End?

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit discussed Toyota's impact
on that court's treatment of ADA claims in Mahon v. Crowell.104 Mr.
Mahon, who had suffered a work-related herniated disk injury, sued his
former employer, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), for disability
discrimination after he lost his job as a steamfitter, which he had held
for over twenty years. '°5
Prior to Toyota, the Sixth Circuit allowed ADA claimants to prove
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working if their
impairments "barred them from a significant percentage of available
jobs. ' 1'° The Sixth Circuit cited its decision in Burns v. Coca Cola
Enterprises, Inc., °7 in which the claimant was considered disabled
because his impairment "precluded him from performing at least 50% of
the jobs he was qualified to perform given his education, background,
and experience." ' In Mahon, a disability analyst had concluded that,
given Mahon's work restrictions, and a study of the geographically
relevant labor market, he "had 'suffered a 47% loss of access to his job
market.'" "9
The Sixth Circuit stated that it was bound by the Supreme Court's
104. 295 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2002).
105. Mr. Mahon brought his claim under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Id. at 587. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that analyses and standards of the
ADA apply to the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 588-89 (citing McPherson v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453,459-60 (6th Cir. 1997)).
106. Id. at 591.
107. 222 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2000).
108. 295 F.3d at 591-92 (quoting Burns, 222 F.3d at 253). The EEOC regulations set
forth factors that might be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working, including: the geographical area to which the
individual has reasonable access and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or abilities within that area from which the individual is disqualified because
of the impairment.
109. Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
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admonition in Toyota to read the ADA's definition of disability "strictly
to create a demanding standard" for claimants. 10 Since Mahon was "still
qualified for over half the jobs" for which he had been qualified before
his injury, the circuit court stated that it "would be using a less-thandemanding standard" were it to find that Mahon was 'disabled.""
Given that Congress intended the ADA to boost productivity and
independence, 2 this "demanding standard" may undermine the actual
goal of the statute.
The folly of this demanding standard is further shown by the postToyota decision of Mink v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."3 Mink was employed
as a truck driver for Wal-Mart in Mississippi. After nine years of
employment, he underwent back surgery for non-work-related injuries,
and then developed a "left foot drop," rendering him unable to lift his
leg properly. 4 Mink's physician mandated that he could only drive a
truck for two minutes a day and could not use his left foot to operate a
foot control."5 Mink subsequently failed to take the required
Department of Transportation physical exam, and thus was terminated
from his job at Wal-Mart."6 A year later, he took and passed the
physical exam."7 Mink filed suit under the ADA, claiming that at the
time of his termination he was "disabled" and that Wal-Mart unlawfully
discriminated against him based on his disability."'
In granting Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment, the court
determined that Mink was not substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. Although Mink may not have been able to perform
the tasks required of a truck driver, he was "not prohibited from finding
employment in another occupation" that did not require him to drive a
commercial vehicle." 9 A physical impairment left Mink, a truck driver,
unable to drive a commercial vehicle. That he was "unable to perform a
class of jobs" appears obvious.' ° The court's ruling to the contrary dims
110. Id. at 590 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197
(2002)).
111. Id. at 592.
112. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
113. 185 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Miss. 2002).
114. Id. at 661.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 661-62.
118. Id. at 662.
119. Id. at 663.
120. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i)).
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the prospects for success of claims based on substantial limitation in the
major life activity of working.
C. Reasonable Accommodation: An Employer's Duty or Defense
Strategy?
While Toyota did not reach the issue of reasonable accommodation,
a post-Toyota decision demonstrates the effect the Court's stringent
definition of disability might have on the ADA's protections. In
121 the
Scarborough v. Natsios,
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia applied Toyota to an employment discrimination
claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.122 In determining
that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, the court considered his assertion that the defendants should
have accommodated him by assigning him to a different position."z By
asserting that he could be reasonably accommodated, the district court
declared, the plaintiff "seriously undercut[] his argument that his ability
to work was substantially limited [by his impairment]. ""
Under the ADA, employers are required to provide reasonable
accommodation to "qualified individuals with disabilities.""z Certainly,
this duty is not triggered unless the individual meets the definition of
"disabled" under the ADA. Nevertheless, to use a request for
reasonable accommodation, or a claim of failure to accommodate, as
proof that the individual is not protected under the statute seems
counterintuitive. That the assertion or exercise of a statutory right can
be used to bar a claim under the statute seems to seriously undercut the
intent of the ADA.

121. 190 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2002).
122. Id. at 21 (concluding that it is "appropriate" to use the definition of substantially
limits under the ADA to interpret the Rehabilitation Act's same phrase).
123. Id. at 20-21.
124. Id. at 23.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. During its 2001-2002 term, the United States Supreme
Court issued two decisions narrowing the meaning of "reasonable accommodation" under the
ADA. In U.S. Airways v. Barnett,the Court held that if a requested accommodation conflicts
with a seniority rule, then ordinarily, but not necessarily, this is sufficient to show that the
requested accommodation is not "reasonable" under the ADA. 535 U.S. 391, 394-95 (2002).
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, a unanimous Court held that an EEOC regulation
allowing employers to refuse to hire applicants on the grounds that their disabilities would
pose a "direct threat" to their own safety in the workplace was permissible. 536 U.S. 73, 74-75
(2002).
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"LIFE'S TROUBLES:" POTENTIAL IMPACT OF TOYOTA AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Although Toyota may be deemed to be an employers' victory, its
long-term impact may reveal that the winner cannot be so easily
identified. Arguably, Toyota provides ADA defendants great incentive
to hire a private investigator to determine whether plaintiffs are
accurately portraying their impairment's effect on their daily life.
Ironically, the subjective nature of these inquiries could make it easier
for plaintiffs to defeat employers' motions for summary judgmentwhether the plaintiff is severely restricted in performing daily activities
is a question of fact best left for the jury. 6
As discussed above, ADA claimants basing their allegations of
disability on their inability to work are now confronted with a very
difficult standard to meet. The threshold for protection may now be set
so high that the very goal of the ADA, to promote employment of those
with disabilities, could become elusive. 7 In order to meet this goal, the
ADA should be amended to set forth a non-exhaustive list of major life
activities, along with an adoption of the EEOC's regulatory standard for
what constitutes a substantial limitation in working. This would allow
for the realities of limitations posed by geographical location, training,
education, skills, and experience to be considered in determining
whether an individual is unable to perform a "class" or "broad range" of
jobs.
In lieu of a legislative solution, employers should be wary of
Faced with a
embracing Toyota in their employment practices.'
request for accommodation from an "otherwise qualified" employee or
applicant, employers should seriously consider not challenging the
existence of the impairment, but instead focus on whether the requested
126. Richard Alaniz and David Barron, "Toyota" Alters How Disability Discrimination
Claims Litigated, TEX. LAW., (March 13, 2002), available at http://www.law.comjsp/
printerfriendly.jsp?c=LawArticle&t=PrinterFriendlyArticle&cid=1019508857437.
127. Arguably, under the stringent standard for determining "disability," those
claimants who are considered "disabled" under the ADA will likely not be "qualified
individuals with a disability: one who is able to perform the essential job functions with or
without reasonable accommodation." Accommodating individuals who are so severely
restricted may be either impracticable or impossible, thus creating an "undue hardship" on
the employer, the provision of which the employer has no duty to provide under the ADA.
See supra note 3 for a discussion of § 12112(b)(5).
128. The "sophisticated management bar trained in seminars to carefully parse the
statutory text of the definition" of disability under the ADA might consider advising clients
to seek internal resolution of applicants' and employees' requests for accommodation. See
Feldblum, supra note 6, at 140.
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accommodation is reasonable. 29' Providing the accommodation may be
more efficient than engaging in a determination of whether individuals'
impairments substantially limit their daily activities."
Efforts to fulfill duties under the ADA without challenging an
individual's assertion of disability under the ADA arguably invites an
ADA claim based on being "regarded as having an impairment."
However, if an employer carefully considers each request for
accommodation as one strategy used to create healthy working
relationships with and among employees, perhaps that employer may be
able to deter such claims. Ultimately, employment practices may make
legislative changes addressing Toyota unnecessary.

129. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2001), an employer may find it necessary to
"initiate an informal, interactive process" to identify possible reasonable accommodations.
130. If the decision in Scarborough v. Natsios indicates a judicial trend, then an
employer facing an ADA claim after making efforts to provide the requested accommodation
will have a defense: The individual's impairment may not be "severely restrictive" enough to
qualify as a disability under the ADA, given the individual's accommodation request. 190 F.
Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2002).

